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Statement of Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction is conferred on Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. 78-2-
2(3)(j). The case has been transferred to the Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Issue Number One: Whether Trial court used Wrong Standard of 
Evidence to dismiss a Federal 1983, 1985 or 1986 claim. The Standard on 
Rule 12b Motions to Dismiss was set by the Supreme Court. "Turning to 
respondents9 final ground, we hold that under the general principles 
laid down in the Steele, Graham, and Howard cases the complaint 
adequately set forth a claim upon which relief could be granted. In 
appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the 
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove 
no set of facts [355 U.S. 41, 46] in support of his claim which would 
entitle him to relief."1 The Tenth Circuit has also issued its opinion as to 
grounds for relief on a 12b motion stating, "Pro Se Litigants should have 
their pleadings reviewed giving them liberal construction. The Utah 
Supreme Court has also ruled "A plaintiff is required, under our liberal 
1
 CONLEY v. GIBSON, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) 
2
 Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 1997) 
5 
standard of notice pleading, to submit a 'short and plain statement... 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and va demand for 
judgment for the relief3/" Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, f 14, 
122 P.3d 622 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l)-(2)) (omission in original). 
"The plaintiff must only give the defendant ffair notice of the nature 
and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of 
litigation involved/"4 Id. (quoting Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 
P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982))/' Given that standard, trial court was in error to 
dismiss this claim especially with prejudice, because it is clear that any 
deficiencies could be corrected with an additional filing. This court should 
review de novo, giving no discretion to the trial courts findings. 
Issue Number Two: Whether trial court was in error when it concluded that Plaintiff 
had failed to establish a claim under 42, USC 1983 against Defendants. Trial court 
concluded that because Defendant Dr. Brown was not a "State Actor" that he could 
not act under "color of Authority of State Law" as is required for a 1983 Claim. The 
court was correct in concluding that in order to invoke 42 USC 1983 that the actions 
of a defendant must be "Under Color of Authority of State Law". The court was 
incorrect in concluding that a "Private Person" can not be included in Federal 1983 
claims. The US Supreme Court has concluded that "Conduct allegedly causing 
3
 Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, f 14, 122 P.3d 622 
4
 Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) 
6 
the deprivation of a constitutional right protected against infringement 
by a State must be fairly attributable to the State. In determining the 
question of "fair attribution," (a) the deprivation must be caused by the 
exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of 
conduct imposed by it or by a person for whom it is responsible, and (b) 
the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly 
be said to be a state actor, either because he is a state official, because he 
has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state 
officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State."5 
"Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited 
action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes of the statute. To 
act "under color" of law does not require that the accused be an officer 
of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity 
with the State or its agents." 6 "Respondent's complaint adequately 
alleges conduct "under color o f state law for purposes of 1983, in view 
of the conspiracy allegations. Although appointed counsel in a state 
criminal prosecution does not act "under color of1 state law in the 
normal course of conducting the defense, Polk County v. Dodson, 454 
U.S. 312 , an otherwise private person acts "under color of1 state law 
5
 LUGAR v. EDMONDSON OIL CO., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) 
6
 UNITED STATES v. PRICE, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) 
7 
when engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive another of 
federal rights, Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 . Pp. 919-920."7 
Issue Number Three: Whether Court committed reversible error when 
it concluded that Gender Discrimination does not apply to Claims brought under 42 
USC 1985. The US Supreme Court set the standard. The court stated that for 1985 
to be invoked the following criteria must be invoked ""To come within the 
legislation a complaint must allege that the defendants did (1) 'conspire 
or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another1 (2) 'for 
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or 
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges 
and immunities under the laws.' It must then assert that one or more of 
the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done, 'any act in furtherance of 
the object of [the] conspiracy,1 whereby another was (4a) 'injured in his 
person or property1 or (4b) 'deprived of having and exercising any right 
or privilege of a citizen of the United States/" 403 U.S., at 102-103."8 
The Supreme Court has concluded that in order to come under 1985 that 
there must be some type of Racial or Class Base discrimination. "The 
language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal 
7
 TOWER v. GLOVER, 467 U.S. 914 (1984) 
8
 GREAT AMERICAN FED. S. & L. ASSN. v. NOVOTNY, 442 U.S. 366 
(1979) 
8 
privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or 
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus 
behind the conspirators' action. 9^ The conspiracy, in other words, must 
aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law 
to all.9 The Court has since ruled that discrimination based upon Gender 
does in fact meet the requirement of 1985. "The "animus" requirement 
demands at least a purpose that focuses upon women by reason of their 
sex, whereas the record indicates that petitioners' demonstrations are 
not directed specifically at women, but are intended to protect the 
victims of abortion, stop its practice, and reverse its legalization. 
Opposition to abortion cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex-
based intent;"10 Since this concerns a rule of law the court should decide 
this issue "De Novo", giving no deference to trial court findings.11. 
\ISSUE NUMBER FOUR: Whether court made a reversible error when it 
concluded that Plaintiff had failed to allege a Common Law Conspiracy against 
Defendant Dr. Brown. To plead a common law conspiracy five elements must be 
alleged: "(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, 
(3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more 
9
 GRIFFIN v. BRECKENRIDGE, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) 
10
 BRAY v. ALEXANDRIA CLINIC, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) 
11
 Kidd v. Taos Ski Valley, Inc., 88 F3d. 848 (10th Cir. 1996) 
9 
unlawful, or over acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof Since the 
court concluded that "The court notes that Plaintiff has not, beyond a very general 
"Blanket:" statement, specified which cause of action are to be applied to Dr. Brown 
so this court will assume that the Plaintiff is alleging that all the causes of action are 
plead against the defendant." Therefore if Plaintiff pled even one cognizable claim 
against any of the defendants, then he has a common law claim for conspiracy 
against Dr. Brown. This should be reviewed "De Novo", giving no deference to 
trial court findings.14 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case was originally filed in Federal District Court, but was dismissed 
because Federal Court concluded that based upon the Roker Feldman and Younger 
Doctrine, that it could abstain from taking Jurisdiction because so many of the claims 
started from a State Court action. Many of the claims started with a Protective order 
and subsequent Divorce between Plaintiff and Defendant Julie Cline. When Federal 
Court declined Jurisdiction, Plaintiff filed this action in Third District Court. 
Because Judge Hilder was named as a Defendant, the case was transferred to Fourth 
District. Several State Defendants have been granted a motion to dismiss, including 
the Judge. At that hearing, and in his brief, Plaintiff had made a motion to be 
12
 Alta Indus. V. Hurst 846 P.2d 1282 
Ruling Re" Defendants motion to dismiss first amended complaint pp 996 
14
 Kidd v. Taos Ski Valley, Inc., 88 F3d. 848 (10th Cir. 1996) 
10 
allowed to modify the complaint. Court granted the motion to amend the complaint 
for Dr. Brown, but denied the motion to amend for claims against Steve Wall. State 
Defendants were also dismissed after that hearing. Later, State Defendants made 
motion to certify the dismissal order as an appeal able order and that motion was 
granted. Plaintiff appealed and the appeal was dismissed on technical grounds. Dr. 
Brown requested a second hearing on the amended motion to dismiss and at the 
hearing, requested that his issues be certified as final appeasable order. Plaintiff has 
appealed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The questions that this court must consider are basically three fold. (1) If Private 
Defendants who enter a conspiracy with state workers are acting under Color of Law, 
of the purposes of a 1983 Claim. (2) If Private individuals who's conspiracy revolves 
around Invidious discrimination on the basis of Sex (gender) is enough to invoke 
Federal 1985, and 1986, and (3) if there is enough detail to in Plaintiffs Complaint to 
invoke any kind of Conspiracy, whether under State Law, of Federal law. 
11 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
Congress, in passing the Fourteenth Amendment and Subsequent 42 
USC 1983,1985 and 1986, intended that people who were deprived basic rights and 
liberties that are guaranteed by the united states constitution should have some form 
of redress through Federal Law. 
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress . . ."15 
The Federal Courts have interpreted this to mean that in order to have 
a claim based upon 1983, that the defendants must have been operating 
"Under Color of Authority of State Law." Generally under Color of 
Authority means action by the state. But the Supreme Court has outlined a 
number if situations where Private Persons can be held liable under Color of 
Authority of State Law. 
When private persons conspire with a Judge or Bribe the Judge they 
become co conspirators. "The action against the private parties accused 
of conspiring with the judge is not subject to dismissal. Private persons, 
15
 42 USC 1983 
12 
jointly engaged with state officials in a challenged action, are acting 
"under colorff of law for purposes of 1983 actions. And the judge's 
immunity from damages liability for an official act that was allegedly 
the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the judge does 
not change the character of his action or that of his co-conspirators."16 
Persons who have been given power by the state, but are not "State 
Actors" are also acting under Color of Authority of State Law. ""Misuse of 
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because 
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 
"under color of state law." And see Screws v. United States, supra, 107-
111. It is common practice, as we noted in Labor Board v. Jones & 
Laughlin Co., 331 U.S. 416, 429 , for private guards or detectives to be 
vested with policemen's powers. We know from the record that that is 
the policy of Miami, Florida. Moreover, this was an investigation [341 u.s. 
97, ioo] conducted under the aegis of the State, as evidenced by the fact 
that a regular police officer was detailed to attend it. We need go no 
further to conclude that the lower court, to which we give deference on 
local law matters, see Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 583 , was 
correct in holding that petitioner was no mere interloper but had a 
16
. DENNIS v. SPARKS, 449 U.S. 24 (1980) 
13 
semblance of policeman's power from Florida. There was, therefore, 
evidence that he acted under authority of Florida law; and the manner 
of his conduct of the interrogations makes clear that he was asserting 
the authority granted him and not acting in the role of a private 
person."17 
When Private individuals use the power of the State Court System in a 
way that it denies any person equal protection under the law, they are acting 
"Under Color of Authority of State Law". "First, the claimed 
constitutional deprivation results from the exercise of a right or 
privilege having its source in state authority, since Leesville would not 
have been able to engage in the alleged discriminatory acts without 28 
U.S.C. 1870, which authorizes the use of peremptory challenges in civil 
cases. Second, Leesville must in all fairness be deemed a government 
actor in its use of peremptory challenges. Leesville has made extensive 
use of government procedures with the overt, significant assistance of 
the government, see, e.g., Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. 
Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 , in that peremptory challenges have no utility 
outside the jury trial system, which is created and governed by an 
elaborate set of statutory provisions and administered solely by 
17
 WILLIAMS v. UNITED STATES, 341 U.S. 97 (1951) 
14 
government officials, including the trial judge, himself a state actor, 
who exercises substantial control over voir dire and effects [500 U.S. 
614, 615] the final and practical denial of the excluded individual's 
opportunity to serve on the petit jury by discharging him or her. 
Moreover, the action in question involves the performance of a 
traditional governmental function, see, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 
461, since the peremptory challenge is used in selecting the jury, an 
entity that is a quintessential governmental body having no attributes of 
a private actor. Furthermore, the injury allegedly caused by Leesvillefs 
use of peremptory challenges is aggravated in a unique way by the 
incidents of governmental authority, see Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 , 
since the courtroom is a real expression of the government's 
constitutional authority, and racial exclusion within its confines 
compounds the racial insult inherent in judging a citizen by the color of 
his or her skin. Pp. 618-628"18 
Discriminatory practices that otherwise would not subject a private 
party to 1983, become attributable to the state when the state court system is 
used to accomplish its objective. "Upon full consideration, however, we 
have found it unnecessary to resolve the constitutional issue which 
18
 EDMONSON v. LEESVILLE CONCRETE CO., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) 
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petitioners advance; for we have concluded that judicial enforcement of 
restrictive covenants by the courts of the District of Columbia is 
improper for other reasons hereinafter stated. 6_ 
Section 1978 of the Revised Statutes, derived from 1 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866,7 provides: f All citizens of the United States shall have the 
same right, in every State and Territory, as is en- [334 U.S. 24 , 31] 
joyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell hold, and 
convey real and personal property/ 8 
All the petitioners in these cases, as found by the District Court, are 
citizens of the United States. We have no doubt that, for the purposes of 
this section, the District of Columbia is included within the phrase 
fevery State and Territory/9 Nor can there be doubt of the 
constitutional power of Congress to enact such legislation with reference 
to the District of Columbia. 1_0_ 
We may start with the proposition that the statute does not invalidate 
private restrictive agreements so long as the purposes of those 
agreements are achieved by the parties through voluntary adherence to 
the terms. The action toward which the provisions of the statute under 
consideration is directed is governmental action. Such was the holding 
of Corrigan v. Buckley, supra. 
16 
In considering whether judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants is 
the kind of governmental action which [334 U.S. 24 ,32] the first 
section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was intended to prohibit, 
reference must be made to the scope and purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; for that statute and the Amendment were closely related 
both in inception and in the objectives which Congress sought to 
achieve. 
Both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the joint resolution which was 
later adopted as the Fourteenth Amendment were passed in the first 
session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress. 11 Frequent references to the 
Civil Rights Act are to be found in the record of the legislative debates 
on the adoption of the Amendment. 12 It is clear that in many 
significant respects the statute and the Amendment were expressions of 
the same general congressional policy. Indeed, as the legislative debates 
reveal, one of the primary purposes of many members of Congress in 
supporting the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to 
incorporate the guaranties of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the organic 
law of the land. 13 Others supported the adoption of the Amendment in 
order to eliminate [334 U.S. 24 ,33] doubt as to the constitutional 
validity of the Civil Rights Act as applied to the States. 14_ 
17 
The close relationship between 1 of the Civil Rights Act and the 
Fourteenth Amendment was given specific recognition by this Court in 
Buchanan v. Warley, supra, 245 U.S. at page 79,38 S.Ct. at page 19, 
L.R.A.1918C, 210, Ann.Cas.l918A, 1201. There, the Court observed 
that, not only through the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
also by virtue of the 'statutes enacted in furtherance of its purpose,' 
including the provisions here considered, a colored man is granted the 
right to acquire property free from interference by discriminatory state 
legislation. In Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, we have held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment also forbids such discrimination where 
imposed by state courts in the enforcement of restrictive covenants."19 
It is even "Under Color of Authority of State Law" if it is the 
"custom" of the state to stand by and watch a private party being 
discriminated and the State does nothing. In this case the only state action 
used to get private parties enjoined under "Color of State Law" was a 
policeman that stood by and let a restaurant owner refuse service to Black 
Students. "The involvement of a policeman, a state official, whether or 
not his actions were lawful or authorized, in the alleged conspiracy 
would plainly provide the state action needed to show a direct violation 
19
 HURD V. HODGE , 334 U.S. 24 (1948) 
18 
of petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment rights entitling her to relief 
under 1983, and private persons involved in such a conspiracy are 
acting ffunder color" of law and can be liable under 1983, Pp. 150-152." 
"Petitioner would have shown an abridgment of her constitutional right 
of equal protection if she proved that respondent refused her service 
because of a state-enforced custom of racial segregation in public 
restaurants."20 
From the cases presented above, it is clear that private parties can and 
do act "Under Color of Authority of State Law" Trial Court was in error 
when it concluded otherwise. The next question is whether Plaintiff has 
stated enough for the Defendant Dr. Brown to conclude what is being 
alleged. 
Federal Case law on 1983 actions is Notice Standard. In other words, 
plaintiff only needs to make enough of a claim to establish the basic concept 
of what he is claiming. "Failure of the complaint to set forth specific facts 
to support its general allegations of discrimination was not a sufficient 
[355 U.S. 41, 42] ground for dismissal of the suit, since the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail 
ADICKES v. KRESS & CO., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) 
19 
the facts upon which he bases his claim." In fact a claim can only be 
dismissed if plaintiff can prove "no set of facts in his case" "Turning to 
respondents' final ground, we hold that under the general principles 
laid down in the Steele, Graham, and Howard cases the complaint 
adequately set forth a claim upon which relief could be granted. In 
appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the 
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove 
no set of facts [355 u.s. 41,46] in support of his claim which would entitle 
him to relief."22 
In Plaintiffs Complaint he made the claim that each defendant 
operated under color of authority of State Law. Plaintiff claimed that he 
was denied rights to Family Associations, and Property Rights.24 He alleged 
that a conspiracy was organized on or about July of 2001 to deny him rights 
guaranteed by the US constitution including home, family and property 
rights. The Fourteenth Amendment Guarantees that "No State . . . Shall 
CONLEY v. GIBSON, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) 
CONLEY v. GIBSON, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) 
First Amended Complaint paragraph 22 
First Amended Complaint paragraph 25 
First Amended Complaint paragraph 28 
20 
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 
The Supreme Court has failed to define exactly what a Liberty interest is but 
it includes bringing up your children, according to the dictates of your own 
concessions. "While this court has not attempted to define with 
exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much 
consideration and some of the included things have been definitely 
stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily 
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any 
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to 
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy 
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."27 
Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Julie and Sharon conspired to make 
false allegations of Child Abuse to deny plaintiff his home and other 
property and associations with his children. There is no doubt that filing 
false child abuse reports are illegal. Later the conspiracy was used to take 
US Constitution-14 Amendment 
MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 
First Amended Complaint paragraph 32 
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away plaintiffs Home (property right). The false allegations were also 
used to interfere in Plaintiffs Business. Plaintiff alleged that it is the 
custom of the state and municipalities to deny rights to fathers in domestic 
O 1 
situations. Plaintiff also alleged that there is a bias against fathers by 
DCFS, and law Enforcement officers, and it is the custom to discriminate 
against fathers. Since DCFS and Law Enforcement officers are all State 
Workers, or they operate under authority granted by state law, then their 
actions are Under Color of Authority of State Law. If any one conspires 
with them to perpetituate that discrimination, then even private parties who 
have conspired with state workers, used the illegal bias to their advantage in 
a state proceeding, or even if the state workers knew about what is 
happening and failed to take any action, then the private parties acted "under 
Color of Authority of State Law55. 
Plaintiff even alleged that it is the custom of District court in Utah to 
discriminate against Fathers in Protective Order Situations. This clearly 
violates federal law as the State of Utah received Grant Money from US 
Government under 42 USC 110 known as "Family Violence Prevention and 
First Amended Complaint paragraph 33 
First Amended Complaint paragraph 36 
First Amended Complaint paragraph 87 
32
 First Amended Complaint paragraph 34 
First Amended Complaint paragraph 54 
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Services", which prohibits states from discriminating on the basis of Gender 
or Sex. (42 USC 10406) Because it is the custom of the state to discriminate 
then Federal Law allows for a claim on gender discrimination in the seeking 
of protective orders. In addition we had a Custody Evaluator Bribed,34 She 
was also put up to making fraudulent statements by DSFS workers and the 
Guardian ad Litem. Court argued that Custody Evaluator and Guardian ad 
Litem is not a State Worker for 1983, but this is false. They are both 
appointed by a court order, which makes their actions directly attributable to 
state action. 
In addition to other issues, Plaintiff was also sentenced to 30 days in 
Jail as a result of the conspiracy. There is also a situation in which Steve 
Wall, Bob Banta (DCFS WORKER) and attorney from the Guardian ad 
Litems office conspired to have DCFS worker perger herself at a contempt 
trial, on the condition that after Plaintiff was convicted, that Steve and Julie 
would then use the finding of contempt and threat of Jail time to force 
Plaintiff to drop his Law suit against Julie, Steve Wall, her parents, and the 
i f 
State. That is a perfect claim for abuse of process as well as using the 
resources of the state to deny Plaintiff a fair trial. 
First Amended Complaint paragraph 61 
First Amended Complaint paragraph 76 
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In paragraph 80 -87 Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested and 
had an illegal search and seizure because he was falsely accused of child 
abuse. Even if they had probable cause to investigate, they Cleary lacked 
jurisdiction over the incident in question. Again State Workers denying 
Plaintiff basic constitutional rights, because DCFS had falsely made him 
appear to be a child abuser. To date the state has done nothing to stop the 
abuse and discrimination. 
From all the above allegations it is very clear that Plaintiff has alleged 
enough to establish a conspiracy to deny him basic rights that were done 
against him both by state workers, and or in conspiracy with private 
individuals. Plaintiff then alleged that Dr. Brown got involved in the 
conspiracy. That he had knowledge that Julie was using the children to 
continue the illegal discrimination against Plaintiff. That he knew there was 
a government investigation to determine if Mr. Packer had assaulted Cline. 
That Dr. Brown failed to bring that information to the people that may be 
able to help. And he made false allegations to the custody evaluator that 
Plaintiffs children were afraid of him. These issues were used to get another 
protective order, and to convict Plaintiff of Contempt of Court, and to keep 
his children away from him. They were also used to take his home and 
Child support away in an action that only the State has the right to do it in. 
24 
(divorce law). Therefore he also acted under color of authority of State Law 
when he participated in the conspiracy. 
To establish a claim under 1985 and 1986, the discrimination can be 
done by purely private individuals as long as it is directed at Class Based 
Invidious Discrimination.36 In addition, if the conspiracy is to infringe 
on first amendment rights (like seeking redress against the government) 
then 1985 applies as long as the state is a party or the aim is to influence 
the activity of the State. "An alleged conspiracy to infringe First 
Amendment rights is not a violation of 1985(3) unless it is proved 
that the State is involved in the conspiracy or the aim of the 
conspiracy is to influence the activity of the State."37 When Steve 
Wall, Bob Banta and an unknown attorney from the Attorney Generals 
office, conspire to use a state worker to make false allegations, used to 
influence the state court system, with the specific intent to deny Plaintiff 
his right to seek redress against the government, it clearly qualifies as in 
violation of the First Amendment. "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 
CARPENTERS v. SCOTT, 463 U.S. 825 (1983) 
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or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances. 
Deprival of First Amendment Rights even includes depriving access 
to the court system. "The right of petition is one of the freedoms 
protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly 
impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms." Id., at 138. 
We followed that view in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 
381 U.S. 657, 669 -671. 
The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups 
of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of 
the legislature, and arms of the executive) and to courts, the third 
branch of Government. Certainly the right to petition extends to 
all departments of the Government. The right of access to the 
courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition. See 
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 ; Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 
549. 
We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association 
and of petition to hold that groups with [404 U.S. 508, 511] 
38
 United States Constitution - First Amendment 
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common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, 
use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and 
courts to advocate their causes and points of view respecting 
resolution of their business and economic interests vis-a-vis their 
competitors."39 
Court has also concluded that a purely Private conspiracy based upon 
gender is not enough to invoke 1985 and 1986. This is also false. The 
Supreme Court has ruled that "The "animus" requirement demands at 
least a purpose that focuses upon women by reason of their sex."40 So 
the Supreme Court has already ruled that Gender Discrimination is 
actionable even for pure private conspiracies. Several other Federal Courts 
have also ruled that Gender Discrimination is actionable in a 1985 claim.41 
Plaintiff has clearly alleged enough to establish a 1985 claim for Gender 
discrimination even if the claim was purely private individuals. But in this 
case, the discrimination also included that state and its workers and so there 
is clearly enough to establish a 1985 claim. 
Once Plaintiff establishes a 1985, claim just alleging that Dr. Brown 
knew about the conspiracy, had some power to stop it and failed to do so 
39
 CALIFORNIA TRANSPORT v. TRUCKING UNLIMITED, 404 U.S. 508 
(1972) 
40
 BRAY v. ALEXANDRIA CLINIC, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) 
41
 Lake v. Arnold D.C. Civ. No. 95-cv-00245J (Third Circuit 1997) 
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establishes a 1986 claim. "Every person who, having knowledge that any 
of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of 
this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid 
in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if 
such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or 
his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, 
which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and 
such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any 
number of persons."42 In fact the Eleventh Circuit concluded that 
Defendants didn't even have to participate in the original conspiracy, but 
they only had to know about it and fail to do anything to stop it and 1986 can 
be invoked. Dr. Brown clearly falls under this category, except that he also 
participated directly. 
Finally even if there was not enough information to establish a 
Federal Law Conspiracy under 1983 or 1985, there is clearly a conspiracy to 
abuse process, and for Libel, slander and Fraudulent Transfer of Assets. 
All that is needed for an abuse of process claim is The Court of 
Appeals recently detailed the requirements for Abuse of Process. "Abuse of 
process has two elements: '"First, an ulterior purpose; second, an act in 
42
 Park v. Atlanta 96-8512 (11th Circ. 1997) 
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the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the 
proceedings.1 ff Id. (citation omitted); see also William Prosser, Law of 
Torts, § 121, at 857 ("The essential elements of abuse of process . . . have 
been stated to be: first, an ulterior purpose, and second, a willful act in 
the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the 
proceeding."43 In that one paragraph Plaintiff alleged that the contempt trial 
was done to abuse process in that its purpose was to coerce Plaintiff into 
dropping his future claims against Steve Wall, Julie, her parents and the CPS 
workers, "the essence of [abuse of process] is a perversion of the process 
to accomplish some improper purpose"); Kool v. Lee, 43 Utah 394,134 
P. 906,909 (1913) ("fAn abuse of legal process is where it is employed 
for some unlawful object not the purpose intended by law/" (citation 
omitted)); William Prosser, Law of Torts, § 121, at 856 (4th ed. 1971) 
(noting that abuse of process occurs when a "legal procedure has been 
set in motion in proper form, with probable cause, and even with 
ultimate success, but nevertheless has been perverted to accomplish an 
ulterior purpose for which it was not designed"). "The usual case of 
abuse of process is one of some form of extortion, using the process to 
put pressure upon the other to compel him to pay a different debt or to 
43
 Hatch v. Davis, 147 P.3d 383 (UT App. 2004) 
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take some other action or refrain from it." Again Plaintiff has clearly 
stated a claim for abuse of process. Because there was more than one person 
involved, it constitutes a conspiracy. If the complaint alleges that Dr. Brown 
participated in that conspiracy, he is a co conspirator. If Dr. Brown told the 
custody evaluator that Josh was afraid of his father, and he knew that to be 
false, it constitutes Slander. When that information was published, it 
constitutes Libel. It is very clear that Plaintiff has stated a claim against Dr. 
Brown. 
But even if Clines Complaint was difficult to read as the court alleged, 
Defendants should have filed a Motion for More Definitive Statement, not a 
Motion to Dismiss. It is clear that Plaintiff has alleged more than enough to 
state a claim against Dr. Brown. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Plaintiff has clearly stated a claim against Dr. Brown, this case 
should be remanded to the District Court. Since Cline has already filed a Motion to 
Recuse Judge Howard, this case should be re-assigned to another judge. Cline 
should be given the opportunity to continue to pursue his claims in this case till he 
has a trial, or until both sides reach a settlement. 
44
 Hatch v. Davis, 147 P.3d 383 (UT App. 2004) 
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Respectfully Submitted this/V Day of March, 
Earl Cline 
Appellant (Pro Se) 
31 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was hand delivered this, cJ> day of March 2008 to: 
Tim Dalton Dunn (0936) 
Dunn and Dunn 
505 East 200 South, 2nd Floor 




R E C E I V E D 
APR 1 2 200? 
FILED 
f-ourth Judicial District Court 
or Utah County, Stale ©j utan 
/ , 
^/£1^J^ De puty 
IN THE F O U R T H J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T C O U R T 
U T A H COUNTY, STATE O F UTAH 
EARL L. CLINEII, 
Plaintiff, 
STATE OF UTAH, EDSON F. PACKER and 
SHARON B. PACKER, ET ALS. 
INCLUDING DEFENDANT DR. KEVIN 
BROWN. 
Defendants. 
RULING RE: DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Case #050401710 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Division 5 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss First Amended 
Complaint. The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises, hereby 
issues the following: 
RULING 
The Court notes that Plaintiff filed a Civil Rights Complaint in the Third Judicial 
District of Utah on March 5, 2005. The case was transferred to this Court after Judge Robert K. 
Hilder of the Third District was made a Defendant in the case. While this Court dismissed the 
original Complaint it granted leave for the Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. The Plaintiff 
did so on October 27, 2005. On November 23, 2005 Defendant, Dr. Kevin Brown filed a Motion 
to Dismiss First Amended Complaint. Subsequently, the Court ordered the dismissal of Judge 
Hilder, Judge Harding, Anthony Ferdon, Michelle Blomquist, Diane Moore, Christ Forsyth, 
Robert Banta, and Mayla Slack fijor CAN ID IT 
3 
aly I, 2(106. Soon afterward the Plaintiff 
appealed this Court's decision. The case has proceeded both in the appellate courts and m this 
Court relative to other defendants over the intervening year. On February 9, 2007 Defendant Dr. 
Kevin Brown filed a Request to Submit relative to the November 23, 2005 Motion to Dismiss. 
This Court conducted a hearing on March 29, 2007 where both sides presented oral arguments. 
The Court now issues its Ruling. 
When considering a motion to dismiss the Court accepts the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable 
to plaintiff. See, Hebertson v. Willow Creek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Utah 1996). Therefore 
the Court accepts, for purposes of this Motion, the allegations in Plaintiff s Amended Complaint 
as true. 
The Plaintiff generally alleges violations of several federal and state law, and suggests 
tortious conduct on the part of the various defendants. The Court notes that the Plaintiff has not, 
beyond a very general "blanket" statement, specified which causes of action are to be applied to 
Dr. Brown so this Court will assume that the Plaintiff is alleging that all of the causes of action 
are plead against the Defendant1. 
1
 |^69 of the First Amended Complaint refers to the alleged wrongs against the Plaintiff as 
follows: 
Valley Mental Health workers including Dr. Kevin Brown also got involved into 
the conspiracy. Kevin Brown testified on behalf of the mother that Petitioner was 
talking to the children about their mother. Joshua told Kevin that Mother had put 
him up to telling Kevin that Mr. Packer hadn't assaulted Petitioner. After Mother 
left the room Josh told Kevin Brown that mother was in fact trying to get him to 
change his story. Kevin failed to report that incident and refused to bring that 
Page 2 of 7 
However, even with the factual presumptions running in the Plaintiffs favor the Court 
cannot, as a matter of law, sustain the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint The Plaintiff has alleged 
that certain actions on the part of Dr. Brown constituted a violation of 42 USCA § 1983. This 
provision in the Federal Code provide recourse for persons who are deprived of a right under 
"color of law" by a government actor. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Brown worked for Valley Mental 
Health, but does not allege that Valley Mental Health or Dr. Brown are state actors2. Therefore, 
§1983 does not provide a basis in law for action against Dr. Brown and as such the 1983 
allegations are unsupported by even the barest of alleged facts. 
The Plaintiff has also pursued a claim under 42 USCA § 1985 which addresses 
obstruction of justice, witness and jury tampering. While the Plaintiff has alleged that Dr. Brown 
"got involved into the conspiracy," the Plaintiff has not alleged facts or law that would indicate 
that Dr. Brown was under a legal duty to report information provided to him by the Plaintiffs 
son Joshua to the Court. The Plaintiff further alleges that Dr. Brown provided testimony on 
information into court. Kevin Brown also made false statements to the Custody 
Evaluator that he knew to be false when he stated that 'Joshua was afraid of 
Plaintiff, and when he told her that4< Alexis had come m and told him a different 
story about the assault in Heber." Pie also knew that he was being used by the 
mother to document issues between the children and Plaintiff. By his knowing 
that he was being used to document for the court the issues between the parties 
and failing to document issues against the mothci he became a willing participant 
m the conspiracy against Mr. Chne. 
2
 |^22 of the Amended Complaint reads: "Di. Kevin Brown is a mental health worker for 
Valley Mental Health, as an individual and under color of authority of state law, with service at 
Valley Mental Health, 1141 E. 3900 S., Salt Lake City, UT 84124 " 
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behalf of the mother. However, how this testimony violated federal, or state law is left unstaled, 
and how this testimony, or other acts or omissions are somehow tied to the tampering of 
witnesses, or other obstruction of justice is unclear. Simply put, the Amended Complaint fails to 
provide sufficient notice to Defendant, Dr. Brown as to how the various federal, or state laws 
cited by the Plaintiff give rise to actionable causes based upon Dr. Brown's alleged actions, 
words, or omissions. 
Finally, the Plaintiff makes a passing reference to an effort to "alienate him from the care 
comfort and consortium of his spouse as well as deny him rights to his children." See, Amended 
Complain! 1(30. This appears to be a tort claim of civil conspiracy against the Defendant, and at 
the March 29, 2007 hearing the Plaintiff rested the bulk of his arguments upon this theory. To 
succeed on a civil conspiracy claim a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) a combination of two or 
more persons. (2) identified an object to be accomplished and (3) a meeting of the mmds relative 
to the object or course occurred, (4) which object constituted an unlawful and over act and (5) 
resulted in damages to the plaintiff See, Israel v. Cannon, 146 P.2d 785, 790 (Ut. App. 1987). 
This Court notes that the Plaintiffs complaint need only include a "short and plain 
statement. . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and "a demand for judgment for the 
relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l)-(2). While that is a generous standard, and while the courts are 
directed to construe pleadings so as to do substantial justice, the Court must also see that 
defendants are pointed to sufficient facts to put them on notice relative to the claim made against 
Page 4 of 7 
them. In most cases thai statement need not be plead with specificity, but presumably the 
Plaintiff is under an obligation to touch upon the bare elements of the alleged cause of action - in 
this case civil conspiracy3. 
The Amended Complaint fails to meet the notice standard. The Court notes that it 
contains no explication as to the Defendant's duty to the Plaintiff, or the damage done by the 
breach of that duty4. Neither, does the Amended Complaint state who Dr. Brown conspired with, 
or what their common purpose was, or how that purpose damaged the Plaintiff. To provide 
adequate notice it seems that a complaint would, at a minimum, touch upon these elements. 
As stated, a complaint does not need to set forth facts in detailed specificity to survive a 
defendant's motion to dismiss, but a defendant is entitled to clear notice as to what law he/she 
has allegedly broken; or what duty he/she has allegedly breached, hi the Amended Complaint the 
Plaintiff has alleged that Dr. Brown did something wrong by not disclosing all of Joshua's 
2
 The Plaintiff argues that as a pro sc litigant the Court should offer him deference relative 
to compliance with the Rules of the Court, and the application of the law. The Court notes, 
however, the Utah Court of Appeals' statement noting that Mr. Chne is a "frequent litigant at the 
district court and appellate court levels and is appropriately charged with knowledge of 
applicable procedures. See, Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11,1|4, 67 P.3d 1000 ("When an 
individual avails [him]self of the judicial machinery as a matter of routine, special leniency on 
the basis of pro se status is manifestly inappropriate."). Cline v. Stale, 2007 Ut App 111. 
4
 Presumably, the Plaintiff maintains that Dr. Brown's failure to disclose all of the 
information offered to him by Joshua to the Court would constitute the breach of a duty. But that 
conclusion requires supposition on the part of the Court and evidences the insufficiency of the 
Amended Complaint. 
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communications to the Court, and made inaccurate statements to the custody evaluator. See, 
Amended Complaint, T|69. However, legal duties that would elevate these alleged omissions, or 
bad acts, to actionable causes are simply not plead. In short, the Plaintiff has painstakingly set 
forth actions that he may view as either illegal, or a breach of duty, but does not set forth 
adequate allegations that the law considers the acts or omissions of the Defendant as grounds for 
a suit. 
A complaint need not be detailed, or even specific, it must provide adequate notice to a 
defendant such that he/she is able to mount a defense to the allegations. The Court cannot be 
generous to the point of allowing a plaintiff to cast an "overly broad net" in an attempt to engage 
the defendant in vague and undefined litigation. Based on the above reasons, the Court hereby 
grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and does so with prejudice. The Court certifies this as 
a final judgment in this matter. 
Dated this [€& day of April, 2007. 
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DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AND 
UPON THE MERITS OF ALL 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DR. 
KEVIN BROWN 
Civil No. 050401710 CR 
Honorable Fred D. Howard 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on March 29, 2007 at 9:00 a.m. Clifford C. 
Ross of Dunn & Dunn, P.C. appeared for Dr. Kevin Brown. Earl L. Cline II, Plaintiff pro se, 
appeared on his own behalf. Before the Court was the written Motion of Defendant Dr. Kevin 
Brown to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint of Plaintiff Earl L. Cline II with prejudice and 
upon the merits. Also before the Court was the verbal motion made by counsel for Defendant 
Dr. Kevin Brown in open court and during the hearing that the Court expressly determine that 
there is no just reason for delay direct and expressly direct that final judgment enter on all 
claims of Dr. Kevin Brown and Plaintiff in accordance with U.R.Cv.P. 54(b). The Court 
made its written ruling filed April 10, 2007 after having carefully considered the oral 
argument by the parties and all pertinent memoranda and other papers on file. Being fully 
informed, the Court now ORDERS and ADJUDGES as follows: 
1. The motion of Dr. Kevin Brown is well taken and is granted. 
2. Plaintiffs complaint, all amendments thereof, and all other claims of Plaintiff 
against Dr. Kevin Brown are dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits. 
3. The Court in accordance with U.R.Cv.P. 54(b) expressly determines that there 
is no just reason for delay and expressly directs that this be entered as the final order and 
judgment disposing of all claims of Plaintiff Earl S. Cline II against Defendant Dr. Kevin 
Brown. 
SO ORDERED and ADJUDGED. 
Dated this £? day of <^^iy^ 2007. 
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CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT 
UNDER 42 U.S.C 1983, & 1985 





Plaintiff, Pro Se, hereby complains and allege of Defendant(s) as follows: 
This claim was original filed in Third District court and has been transferred to Fourth 
District Court. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is appropriate. This claim includes a previous claim filed against Dr. 
Malovich and Associated Clinical and Counseling Psychologists Claim #04093539. It 
was dismissed pending a hearing allegedly required by Utah Medical Malpractice act. 
1 
Utah Court of appeals stated that claim could be re-filed within one year. Claim also 
includes a claim filed against State of Utah and numerous other state employees, which 
was filed on December 28, 2004 in Federal District Court. (#2:04 CVOl 187 DAK) Claim 
was dismissed by Federal Court because some of the claims are "inextricably Intertwined 
with State Court Issues". Federal Court declined to take jurisdiction and it is now being 
filed in state court. Because claim includes claims against state district court judge and 
Guardian ad Litems, Plaintiff intends to move for change of venue. 
In addition some of the claims including specifically against DCFS and Chris 
Forsyth were partially presented in Case number 040911905, which was dismissed 
against state and Chris Forsyth. Case is currently in court of appeals (20041112). 
Because original claims against State could not be brought against individual state 
workers except for Chris Forsyth, Governmental immunity act states that if case against 
State is dismissed, a claim can then be brought against the individual state workers. Part 
of this claim includes that various state workers who were negligent in their duties 
surrounding many of the issues presented in this claim. 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff, Earl L. Cline II, is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and 
1565 E. 7200 So., Salt Lake City, Utah., 84121 
2. Defendant(s), State of Utah, upon information and belief, is a State as 
authorized under and within the authority of the United States Constitution. 
Service upon Mark Shurtleff, Attorney General, 160 E. 300 So., 6th floor, P.O. 
Box 140833, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. Does 1 - 20, are all employees of 
or private individuals, and or divisions within the state government, working 
2 
under some protection as granted by state law or by direct authority of the 
State of Utah, and are all/or were acting under authority of the State or under 
Color of Authority of State Law. Some may have exceeded protection 
granted by Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and may be sued as an 
individual as well as under Color of Authority of State Law. (U.C.A. 63-30-3) 
Any not named at this time will be properly enjoined by motion as their names 
and other relevant facts are made known. Per dismissal of previous claim 
against State and DCFS, this claim is for injunctive and declaratory relief 
against the state only. Individual employees listed as Doe's are as individuals 
and under color of authority. 
3. Doe Number One is the Department of Human Services, Division of Child 
and Family Services, AKA Child Protective Services, AKA DCFS and AKA 
CPS, a division of the State of Utah, for declaratory and injunctive relief, with 
service upon the Mark Shurtleff as stated above and DCFS at 120 N. 200 W., 
P.O. Box 45500, Salt Lake City, UT 84145. 
4. Doe Number Two is Robyn Arnold-Williams, an employee of the state of 
Utah and under color of authority of state law, as an individual, with service 
upon Mark Shurtleff as stated above, and DCFS as stated above. 
5. Doe Number Three is Judge Sheleigh Harding, as an employee of the State of 
Utah and under color of authority of state law, as Administrative Law Judge 
For Department of Human Services, with service upon Mark Shurtleff as 
stated above and DCFS as stated above. 
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Doe Number Four is Diane Moore, as an individual and as an employee of the 
State of Utah and under color of authority of state law, as Division of Child 
and Family Services employee, a division of Human Services, with service 
upon Mark Shurtleff as stated above and upon DCSF as stated above. 
Doe Number Five is Chris Forsyth, as an individual and as an employee of the 
State of Utah and under color of authority of state law, as Division of Child 
and Family Services employee, a division of Human Services, with service 
upon Mark Shurtleff as stated above and upon DCSF as stated above. 
Doe Number Six is Robert Banta AKA Bob Banta, as an employee of the 
State of Utah and under color of authority of state law, as Division of Child 
and Family Services employee, a division of Human Services, with service 
upon Mark Shurtleff as stated above and upon DCSF as stated above. 
Doe Number Seven is Mayla W. Slack, as an individual and as an employee 
of the State of Utah and under color of authority of state law, as Division of 
Child and Family Services employee, a division of Human Services, with 
service upon Mark Shurtleff as stated above and upon DCSF as stated above. 
Doe Number Eight is Heather Godfrey, as an employee of the State of Utah 
and under color of authority of state law, as Division of Child and Family 
Services employee, a division of Human Services, with service upon Mark 
Shurtleff as stated above and upon DCSF as stated above. 
Doe Number Nine is Third District Court, a division of the State of Utah, for 
injunctive and declaratorily relief only, with Service upon Mark Shurtleff as 
Stated above and upon Third District Court, Brent Johnson, Administrative 
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Office of the Courts, 450 S. State Ste N31, P.O. Box 140241, SLC, UT, 
84114. 
12. Doe Number Ten is Anthony Fredon esq., Guardian ad Litem, as an 
individual, and as a quasi officer of the court, under Color of Authority of 
State Law, with Service upon Mark Shurtleff as Stated above and upon Third 
District Court, Brent Johnson, Administrative Office of the Courts, 450 S. 
State Ste N31, P.O. Box 140241, SLC, UT, 84114. 
13. Doe Number Eleven is Michelle Bloomquist esq., Guardian ad Litem, as an 
individual, and as a quasi officer of the court, under Color of Authority of 
State Law, with Service upon Mark Shurtleff as Stated above and upon Third 
District Court, Brent Johnson, Administrative Office of the Courts, 450 S. 
State Ste N31, P.O. Box 140241, SLC, UT, 84114. 
14. Doe Number Twelve is The Honorable Judge Robert K. Hilder, District Court 
Judge, for Third District Court of and for the State of Utah, under Color of 
Authority of State Law, for damages for administrative actions and for 
injunctive relief, with Service upon Mark Shurtleff as Stated above and upon 
Third District Court, Brent Johnson, Administrative Office of the Courts, 450 
S. State Ste N31, P.O. Box 140241, SLC, UT, 84114. 
15. Any remaining Doe's will be named at a later time as additional information 
becomes available. 
16. Defendant(s) Edson F. Packer and Sharon B. Packer are married but are 
individuals for the purpose of this action, in association with the State of Utah 
and under Color of Authority of State Law. Service is upon them individually 
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at 915 S. 4800 E., P.O. box 638, Heber, UT 84032, and includes various 
entities with which defendants the Packers, conduct business and include; the 
Edson F. Packer Trust, and the Sharon B. Packer Trust, SHED partners, a 
partnership under their direction. 
17. Defendant(s) Julie Camp is AKA Julie P. Cline, AKA Julie M. Packer. 
Service is at 915 S. 4800 E., P.O. Box 638, Heber, UT 84032. 
18. Associated Clinical and Counseling Psychologists is a corporation licensed 
under the laws of the State of Utah, with service upon David Dodgin at 5691 S 
Redwood Rd., Suite 15, Taylorsville, UT 84123. 
19. Dr. Natalie Malovich is an individual, and under color of authority of state 
law, with service at, 5691 S Redwood Rd., Suite 15, Taylorsville, UT 84123. 
20. Vicki Sharp is purported to be an employee of Associated Clinical and 
Counseling Psychologists as an individual, and under color of authority of 
state law, with service at 5691 S. Redwood Rd., Suite 15, Taylorsville, UT 
84123. 
21. Steve Wall is purported to be an individual licensed to practice law in and by 
the laws of the state of Utah. Various does include Wall and Wall, as well as 
Steven Wall P.C., both of which the exact nature of the ownership entity are 
not known, but will be made available upon motion. Service is upon Steve 
Wall, at Wall & Wall, 4460 South Highland Dr., Suite 300, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84117. 
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22. Dr. Kevin Brown is a mental health worker for Valley Mental Health, as an 
individual and under color of authority of state law, with service at Valley 
Mental Health, 1141 E. 3900 S., Salt Lake City, UT, 84124 
23. Any other doe's not specifically named at this time will be named upon 
motion, or as other court rules may allow, when that information becomes 
available. 
General Allegations 
24. The issues began as a Protective Order case and quickly turned into a Divorce 
Case as well as many other complaints and violations of various state laws. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when a judgment is obtained 
through Fraud that a new complaint can be filed to overturn the original 
judgment. Plaintiff Julie Cline filed a Protective Order on or about March 1, 
2002. In it she, through fraud obtained control of Children, Home and all 
other marital assets of her and Plaintiff. The protective order soon became a 
Divorce and the Fraud continued throughout the case. 
25. Federal Law provides that when the state or other individuals under color of 
authority of state law interfere in denying rights guaranteed to individuals 
through the constitution, and through invidious discrimination, those deprived 
of those rights to family associations, including specifically marriage and 
raising children, property rights have a claim through federal law. 
26. Utah State law provided for tort damages for anyone interfering in or 
attempting to alienate the affections of a person from their spouse and or 
children. 
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27. Under Doctrine of Pendant Jurisdiction, Federal courts can adjudicate state 
claims when they are intertwined with federal claims. Because Federal Court 
has declined Jurisdiction, Claims now must be heard in State Court. 
28. A civil conspiracy as defined by 42 U.S. C. 1985 was organized on or about 
July of 2001, with its purpose to deny plaintiff rights guaranteed by the united 
states constitution, as well as its various amendments, and the laws of the 
United States and the laws of the state of Utah. Its purpose specifically was to 
deny Plaintiff rights to his home, family, and other property rights, and to 
alienate him from the affections of his spouse and his children. 
29. All defendants are purported to have operated in violation of The United 
States Constitution, many laws of the United States, the State of Utah and 
various other laws, and under color of authority of state law. 
30. Defendants are purported to have violated the following laws in furtherance of 
its illegal conspiracy or aided others in violating them including but not 
limited to the following: First, Fourth, Fifth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution, Federal Laws including; 42 U.C.A. 667, 42 
U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 18U.S.C. 1581 and 1589. In addition, the 
following state laws were also violated in furtherance of its illegal conspiracy, 
including: Utah Code Annotated, (UCA) 30-6-4.3, UCA 77-36-1, UCA 78-7-
19, various Utah Laws related to Determining Child Support, various laws 
related to Protective Orders, and various laws related to Divorce. These 
violations of the law were done to violate Petitioners rights to equal protection 
under the law, and were done to discriminate against him because of his 
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gender, and to alienate him from the care comfort and consortium of his 
spouse as well as deny him rights to his children. 
First Cause of Action 
Civil conspiracy to deprive rights as guaranteed under the fourteenth 
amendment and other federal laws, and under Color of Authority of State Law 
31. Plaintiff reaffirms and realleges paragraphs 1 - 30 as though set forth fully 
herein. 
32. On or about July of 2001, Defendant Julie Camp, and Sharon Packer 
conspired to falsely accuse Plaintiff of spouse abuse as Sharon admitted that 
Plaintiff had never done anything physically to her daughter Julie, but still 
encouraged her to get a protective order to "keep him away from the house", 
and his children. At that time Julie decided not to do it because it would "only 
make him (Plaintiff) mad". 
33. During that same month, Defendant Steve Wall was brought into the illegal 
conspiracy, when he spoke with Plaintiff about representing him and 
Defendant Julie, in a divorce action. Steve agreed to represent both parties in 
an uncontested divorce and at that point was told all sorts of confidential 
information about counseling, employment and other issues related to the 
divorce by Plaintiff. Steve was encouraged to by Defendant Sharon to tell her 
all of the information that plaintiff had told to him. This was in violation of 
his Rules of Lawyer Conduct. Because of this he should have disqualified 
himself from further involvement in the case, but didn't, because as he 
admitted in court on December 17, 2003, he had a substantial financial interest 
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in the case. Throughout the case he also allowed and allegedly encouraged his 
client Julie to continue to commit perjury and to file knowingly false 
affidavits and other forms of deceit and abuse of process. Steve helped Julie 
and her parents, Defendants Edson and Sharon Packer to sell marital home 
owned by Mr. and Mrs. Cline to be sold to Packers without Mr. Cline's 
knowledge or permission. This was in violation of UCA 25-6, the fraudulent 
transfers of assets. Later Steve allowed Mr. Packer, who was not Steve's 
Client to testify in court that he believed that the Laytham Way home really 
belonged to him and Clines were renting it from him. Steve absolutely knew 
that those claims were false and fraudulent. He has an affirmative duty from 
Rule 3.3 to disclose his client's fraudulent actions. 
On or about November 23, 2001 Defendants Sharon Packer, Julie Cline and 
Steve Wall conspired to fraudulently accuse Plaintiff of spouse abuse so as to 
get him out of the home and get control of children. West Jordan Police were 
called to document a "Non Violent" disagreement between Plaintiff and 
Defendant Julie Cline. Later they decided to wait till after the holidays to 
fraudulently accuse Plaintiff of Abuse. Defendant Julie confirmed that she 
and her mother had spoken with Steve and he encouraged her to wait till after 
Christmas, but according to Julie he stated, we can get Earl out any time we 
decide to. Steve tried to hide from the court, the fact that he had spoken to 
other defendants that time. Steve Julie, and Sharon all knew of the complete 
falsity of the information that was being presented to court in the protective 
order. Steve instructed Julie to use the services of legal aid to try and avoid 
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his obligation to disclose the fraudulent acts of his clients. Steve also knew 
that there was an underlying bias against fathers by DCFS, workers and Law 
Enforcement officers in Utah and that it is a generally accepted practice within 
the organizations to discriminate against Fathers in these types of situations. 
Prior to Steve's involvement in this case the police were never called against 
Plaintiff for any situation in the previous 16 years of marriage. In the first 2 
years after Steve's involvement the police and DCFS were called over 35 
times with false allegations. 
In February of 2002 Defendant Sharon contacted Lorna Cline, mother of 
Plaintiff, by phone from Hawaii, to try to get her to engage in helping Sharon 
to deprive plaintiff of his property rights and other civil rights. Lorna told 
Sharon to stay out of the marriage. She also contacted a dentist that Plaintiff 
was using to treat the children so as to encourage him not to treat the Cline 
children. Sharon could then force Plaintiff to sell his car to her. 
On or about February 27, 2002 Sharon was angry at Plaintiff, for refusing to 
sell her his car and so the very next day or thereabouts, after returning from 
Hawaii, put defendant Julie up to again filing a false Protective Order in order 
to deny plaintiff of his rights to associations with his children, destroy his 
business which he had ran out of the home, and to conspire to take away rights 
to his home and other property. This time Julie went through with it. All of 
the allegations that she made about Plaintiff abusing son Robert (14) at that 
time were proven false. An affidavit from Plaintiffs sister shows that Julie 
had known that she was going to get a protective order against Plaintiff even 
11 
before the alleged event that she used to get the order, suggesting that she was 
again making up things to use to deprive Plaintiff his rights. 
37. Because of the Febuary 28, 2002, ex party protective order, Child protective 
services and the Guardian ad Litem were ordered to investigate any 
allegations that Plaintiff had abused his children. The report came back 
negative and the protective order was dismissed. 
38. With the filing of an April 11, 2002 divorce by Julie, she made up more false 
allegations as well as used allegations that had been previously ruled on by 
other Judges and dismissed, against Plaintiff. CPS worker Chris Forsyth and 
GAL Michelle Bloomquist entered the conspiracy, by falsely making up new 
allegations of abuse against Plaintiff, claiming that they had been told that 
information by plaintiffs children. 
39. Chris Forsyth knew the allegations were un-true as she was the same one that 
investigated the allegations against Plaintiff earlier. She pretended that she 
hadn't previously investigated and un-substantiated the allegation that 
Plaintiff had abused Robert, just three weeks before. She then violated a 
number of laws in order to hide her illegal actions including perjuring herself 
in two court actions. The perjury was documented in an October 17, 2003 
hearing on the abuse charges. Guardian ad Litem Michelle Bloomquist 
participated by making up a false allegation that the court had ordered a new 
investigation, when in fact they had not. GAL Anthony Ferdon knew the 
fraud and misrepresentation of the CPS worker and Michelle, but failed to do 
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anything about it. By his knowledge of the conspiracy and failure to stop it he 
also became a willing participant in the fraud. 
40. During the next year many other CPS workers entered and participated in the 
illegal conspiracy. In every one of CPS actions after that all decisions made 
by workers were done to discriminate against Plaintiff because of his sex, and 
to deny him equal protection under the law. The discrimination caused 
plaintiff to spend several days in hearings, and trials defending himself against 
false allegations and ultimately they were used against him to bias and 
prejudice the divorce court, even though they were all proven to be false. 
41. The remaining CPS workers were listed above and each one discriminated 
against plaintiff and or denied him equal protection under the law and as 
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution. They either 
failed to take action to protect cline children from Julie, and or Sharon Packer, 
by failing to do anything about their behavior, or they made up false and 
fraudulent allegations about Plaintiff. All details of the specific incidents will 
be brought up in trial. 
42. Mayla Slack lied about the fact that minor child Chris (13) had told her about 
when Julie hit him with a belt. She also failed to substantiate against Julie and 
Sharon Packer for leaving a bruise on minor Child Erika (5) when Erika, Ciera 
and Josh all provided testimony that grandma Packer had spanked them and 
left a bruise. There were even pictures of the bruise provided to Mayla. She 
also caught Sharon Packer lying about spanking Erika but did nothing about 
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that, instead she leveled allsorts of false allegations against Petitioner. Mayla 
and Chris Forsyth both work directly for Dianne Moore. 
43. Dianne knew of the false report that Chris was making in which she was 
making up allegations that the Cline children were alleged to have said in 
order to discredit plaintiff in the divorce. Dianne had specific knowledge of 
the events as Plaintiff talked to her several times early on while CPS was 
supposed to be investigating the allegation that plaintiff had abused Robert. 
Dianne was the one that told plaintiff of the fact that Chris wouldn't 
substantiate against him because the children had told Chris that there wasn't 
any bruising. Dianne, Chris and Mayla all were very involved in making up 
substantial fraudulent misrepresentations about the facts surrounding the 
alleged abuse of the Children. 
44. Chris Forsyth got caught lying in court under sworn testimony. For sure Chris 
has exceeded her protection granted by the State Governmental Immunity act, 
and Dianne and Mayla have most assuredly done the same. They should be 
personally liable for their torts. Bob Banta got involved early on and certainly 
knew of Plaintiffs concerns about Dianne Moore's team as Plaintiff met with 
him and played a tape of Josh and Christopher stating that they never told 
Chris Forsyth that they were ever bruised in any way. He certainly could have 
done a lot to stop the fraud, but plaintiff has no direct proof that he was 
involved in planning or actually perpetrating the fraud. 
45. Heather Godfree first interviewed Minor Child Alexis (17) then when Alexis 
was put up to making false allegations that she had been sexually abused by 
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petitioners brother when she was six years old. In the process of her 
investigation, Heather knew or should have known that Alexis was put up to 
lie for her mother Julie. The evidence was overwhelming that Alexis was 
being asked to make up that fact, when less than six months earlier Alexis had 
told Chris Forsyth that "Alan doesn't do anything to make me feel 
uncomfortable". That alone should have been enough for Heather to have 
concluded that Alexis was put up to do this, but in addition, Alexis also 
identified the time period of when it was supposed to have happened and also 
identified the fact that her cousins Ben, Steven and her Brother Robert were 
all there at the time. The problem with Alexis testimony is that during that 
time period, Ben and Steven were living clear across the country in Georgia 
and were never in a situation in which Alexis and the four boys could have 
been abused. 
Later Heather was given testimony by Chris about a time when his mom, 
(Julie) had wrapped his hands, legs and mouth in Duck Tape. There was also 
an incident in which Julie threw Chris on the bed and injured his shoulder. 
Both should have been used as abuse against Julie but again because of her 
gender nothing was done to Julie. 
Edson and Sharon Packer continued to make false allegations against plaintiff 
in order to further tie his hands in defending against there onslaught of false 
allegation and to bias other court actions so they could get access to Plaintiffs 
home and other property, and to destroy his relationship with his children. A 
pattern developed where they, including Julie would make up a false 
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allegation, get an ex party order, and even though it would be dismissed, they 
would go to another court or judge and state that plaintiff had done things that 
he had previously gotten dismissed, in order to get new orders and new cases 
against him. This was in violation of state law, which prohibits bringing the 
same issue multiple times before different judges and also the legal principle 
of res judicata. Several protective orders were sought as well as a civil 
stalking injunction and they were dismissed; yet they continued to use the 
same incidents over and over to get new charges against Plaintiff. 
48. The Packers and Julie also made false allegations about loans and other 
fraudulent statements all designed to discredit plaintiff in divorce court and to 
deprive him of rights to his children and property rights. 
49. Steve Wall participated in and purportedly encouraged this illegal action 
knowing that divorce court in Utah would side with a mother over a father 
when unable to ascertain the truthfulness of allegations. Rule 3.3 and other 
rules of attorney conduct give him an affirmative obligation to disclose 
conduct or allegations he knows to be false. He became a willing participant 
in the fraud when he failed to disclose such to court. 
50. Because of all the false allegations, Court ordered several orders related to 
minor child Robert in which court lacked jurisdiction because of Roberts's 
involvement with the Juvenal court. Julie, Sharon and the Guardian ad Litem 
pushed for all the orders. Because of these orders plaintiff had to move from 
his home for a second time in about three months. He had to move his 
business, and all his personal belongings. The allegations used to get the 
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court to make the orders were false, previously ruled upon by other courts and 
or judges, and court lacked jurisdiction. Steve Wall, Michelle Bloomquist and 
Anthony Ferdon all knew of the previous Jurisdiction of Juvenal Court with 
regards to Robert and the order for him to live in with Plaintiff in the paternal 
grandparents home. All had an obligation to inform the court of that 
jurisdiction. (Rule 3.3) None of them did and in fact Steve helped his client try 
to hide it. 
51. This second move impacted plaintiffs ability to continue to make a living as 
well as his having to continually defend him self from new fraudulent 
allegations. Once the orders were made, they were almost impossible to make 
them go away even when plaintiff proved that they were illegal, un-necessary 
and discriminatory. This is all part of the process by which the court in Utah 
deprives men of their rights, by allowing women to make up false allegations 
of abuse, and even after they are proven false, the repercussions continue to 
follow in the courts system. 
52. Steve Wall and (GAL) Michelle are both attorneys and should have known 
that orders were illegal for lack of jurisdiction. State law states they should be 
held in contempt of court for continually seeking order from a different court 
after they were previously ruled upon in another court. 
53. In June of 2002, Julie, Sharon and Steve Wall conspired to file a false 
affidavit stating that plaintiff had made almost ten times more income then he 
actually did in order to sway the divorce judge to increase child support over 
what plaintiff could pay. Court including the Honorable Commissioner Evans 
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issued a child support order that was in violation with Federal and State laws 
regarding child support orders. Subsequent to that when plaintiff came back 
to modify that order when additional children came to live with petitioner, 
court refused to adjust child support downward. Later plaintiff was convicted 
of contempt of court for failing to pay all the child support ordered even 
though he continued to maintain that the order was to high and was illegal. 
Plaintiff spent close to 30 days in jail for this and the appellate court should 
overturn the contempt order because it is considered to be a void order by the 
appellate court. Again these were done to discriminate against plaintiff 
because of his sex and to prevent him from equal protection under the law. 
Plaintiff filed two protective orders against defendant Julie, for abusing their 
children and both were denied, even though the events fit the legal definition 
of abuse. The Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis, coincidentally, reviewed both 
of them and denied them both. In the second one, she even denied plaintiff a 
right to a hearing as is required by state law. Defendant Julie had three 
protective orders applied for and two were issued for situations that were even 
on their face, much less abusive than the situations in which plaintiff was 
turned down for them. This is further evidence that district court in Utah is 
biased against fathers, when it comes to divorce and protective orders. In 
reality she even made up the stuff that she was using to get those protective 
orders, but Utah will not prosecute women for lying to get a protective order. 
With each protective order, plaintiff lost significant rights to his children and 
or property rights. 
18 
At a November 22, 2002 hearing in DCFS court presided over by 
Administrative Law Judge Shellie Harding, to have substantiation of 
allegation that plaintiff abused Robert overturned, all members of the Cline 
family, including Julie (camp), and four of the cline children testified that they 
had never seen a bruise on minor son Joshua (11). Because the testimony was 
so overwhelming that CPS worker Chris Forsyth had made up the allegation 
that Josh had told her that he had been bruised by petitioner with a belt, ALJ 
Shellie Harding, made up the allegation that "Joshua's injuries had occurred in 
California". There was absolutely no testimony to support that allegation. 
This was a blatant effort on the part of DCSF to cover for CPS/DCFS worker 
Chris Forsyth after she got caught making up fraudulent information against 
plaintiff. This evidences that when a state worker decides to violate state laws 
and use their authority under color of authority, to break laws and violate 
rights that the state has the ability to continue perpetrating the fraud by getting 
other employees to cover for them. 
Dr. Natalie Malovich and Associated Clinical and Counseling Psychologists 
became involved when a custody evaluation was ordered. Dr. Malovich was 
ordered to do that. In the beginning of the evaluation she seemed to be very 
fair and had an open mind about the situations. Several times she stated that 
she would call Michelle Bloomquist and make sure that she was told about 
Julie doing a great deal of manipulating of the children to get them to testify 
against their father. In the end Petitioner and Dr. Malovich got in a 
disagreement about billing and She then turned on Plaintiff. She produced a 
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fraudulent report in which she blamed Plaintiff for all the problems of the 
divorce as well as blaming him for things that he didn't even do. She also 
failed to report many of the issues that she knew Julie had been involved in 
and knew Julie was manipulation the children's testimony. 
She concluded that Plaintiff had a longstanding personality disorder involving 
narcissism. The fact that she used narcissism is evidence of her gender bias, 
as narcissism is almost exclusively a male personality disorder. Plaintiff 
contends that he doesn't meet the requirements needed by DSM-IV needed to 
establish the disorder, but even if he did, Dr. Malovich still failed to diagnose 
Julie as having a Personality disorder when she met at least seven of the 
required diagnostic criteria for a Dependant Personality Disorder, and there 
was substantial evidence that Julies issues actually started when she was still a 
young child. DSM-IV requires only five of the traits. Utah Law prohibits 
psychological evaluations from being used in a divorce in which all the issues 
used to determine a disorder came from situations after the divorce started. 
Dr. Malovich did testing on both Julie and Plaintiff. She claimed that her 
testing of Mr. Cline revealed a personality disorder. She claimed that there 
was no evidence in her testing that Julie had any evidence of a personality 
disorder. Both were fraudulent as Plaintiffs testing came back showing no 
evidence of any disorder. Julies testing showed considerable probability of a 
disorder. There are also many other examples that will be brought out at trial 
to illustrate that She discriminated against Plaintiff because of his gender and 
conspired to deprive him of equal protection under the law. She was most 
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assuredly put up to this by GAL, Michelle Bloomquist who got herself 
involved in the conspiracy early on and needed someone to blame all the 
issues on Plaintiff so as to make it harder for him to come after her and the 
other parties to this conspiracy. Dr. Malovich also does considerable contract 
work with DCFS and was put up to this by someone high up in that office. 
60. Defendant Vicki Sharp was put up to making fraudulent allegations that she 
had heard Mr. Cline speak to his children over the phone and he was saying 
negative things about there mother. Dr. Malovich knew that the allegations 
were false because her own records showed that Robert was in D.T. and Chris 
and the other children were in Heber with there Grandparents. Dr. Malovich 
and Associated Clinical Counseling Psychologists have an obligation to 
supervise her and they failed to do so. They also are probably liable through 
Respondent Superior. 
61. Dr. Malovich also violated a contract with Mr. Cline in which she agreed to a 
financial contract and then billed almost 4 times as much as agreed upon. She 
got the court to order her billing paid and as such used her influence with the 
court to illegally deprive Plaintiff of rights to property. Defendant Sharon 
Packer also bribed Dr. Malovich. She also may have had an illegal 
conversation with Judge Hilder about him wanting psychological evaluation 
don on Plaintiff to determine "what was driving him". 
62. With the filing of Divorce Julie and Plaintiff both claimed Laytham Way 
home was Marital Property. Shortly after filing of Protective order, 
Defendant Julie signed an $80,000 trust deed against the home, to her parents. 
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After she had borrowed all the equity, she then sold the home to her dad. She 
kept position and continued to live there. The transfer was fraudulent and met 
the requirements for Fraudulent Transfers of Assets as defined by Utah law. 
Later the both testified in court that the home was not marital property. Court 
gave property to the Packers even though they were not parties to the divorce 
and there was no legal basis to give them the home. The purpose was to 
frequently deny Plaintiff to his share of the equity in the home. 
63. Because of all the actions of various defendants in the divorce and the other 
surrounding cases, the real motive was to deny Plaintiff rights guaranteed by 
the thirteenth amendment by taking away all his assets, getting court to order 
support payments that were extremely high in relation to his income, as well 
as ordering payment of Defendant attorney fees. This is alleged to be in 
violation of Thirteenth Amendment as well as federal peonage laws. 
64. Many different court cases were filed against Plaintiff without any real basis 
for them. This is alleged to be malicious prosecution and or abuse of process. 
65. Numerous times Julie called the West Jordan Police and fraudulently alleged 
that she had a Protective Order against Plaintiff and they then came out to the 
home. Never once would the police document that she was making false 
Reports. Various West Jordan Police officers will be enjoined into this case 
as doe's, by motion as names and dates become available. 
66. Twice reports were made to Wasatch County Sheriffs office and the officer 
investigating the incidents refused to do anything about assault charges. Both 
times Julie, Mr. and Mrs. Packer and their children including Neil Packer, 
22 
Bart Packer and Kelly Packer were asked to lie to police about the incidents. 
The incident that occurred on June 14, 2003, at the Packer home in Heber, 
UT, and the officer was Negligent and ether knew or should have known that 
Packers were lying. He also failed to interview the Cline children who were 
all witness to the assault on plaintiff. Those officers will be named as 
additional dos as their names and information can be ascertained. 
Various neighbors were also used to make fraudulent allegations against 
Plaintiff. John Bartlet was asked to call the police and accuse plaintiff of 
steeling his own car. Fred Bobo was asked to make a fraudulent claim that 
Petitioner had violently assaulted Julie. He either knew the claims were 
fraudulent or had no basis to make the accusations. They may also be 
enjoined as additional doe's as further information becomes available. 
Several South Salt Lake City police officers responded to a call at Salt Lake 
County Juvenal Receiving Center, when Julie had represented that she had a 
protective order against Plaintiff. Julie was trying to get oldest son Robert to 
come and live with her in violation of Juvenal Court order. Julie lied and 
stated that there wasn't a custody order regarding Robert. Police officers 
knew or should have known that there was and should have given Robert back 
to Plaintiff. They instead gave Robert back to his mother. When Mr. Cline 
stated he was going to go to get a copy of the custody order, they sent Julie 
and Robert home and called West Jordan Police to have them stop Mr. Cline 
from getting custody of Robert. That action is enough to establish Malice. By 
there illegal actions they involved themselves in the illegal conspiracy. They 
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will be enjoined by motion into this action as Doe's when further information 
becomes available. 
Valley Mental Health workers including Dr. Kevin Brown also got involved 
into the conspiracy. Kevin Brown testified on behalf of the mother that 
Petitioner was talking to the children about their mother. Joshua told Kevin 
that Mother had put him up to telling Kevin that Mr. Packer hadn't assaulted 
Petitioner. After Mother left the room Josh told Kevin Brown that mother 
was in fact trying to get him to change his story. Kevin failed to report that 
incident and refused to bring that information into court. Kevin Brown also 
made statements to the Custody Evaluator that he knew to be false when he 
stated that "Joshua was afraid of Plaintiff', and when he told her that "Alexis 
had come in and told him a different story about the assault in Heber". He 
also knew that he was being used by the mother to document issues between 
the children and Plaintiff. By his knowing that he was being used to 
document for the court the issues between the parents and the children, and his 
helping to document issues against the father and failing to document issues 
against the mother he became a willing participant in the conspiracy against 
Mr. Cline. 
LDS Social Services Worker, Stewart Karen was counseling Robert, when he 
became aware of the Civil Conspiracy and became aware of DCFS workers 
fraudulent miss-representations against Plaintiff. He was also a DCFS 
worker. He worked as LDS Social Services at night. Shortly after the trouble 
started with Chris Forsyth, Stewart Karen became aware of situations in which 
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Defendant Julie Cline was abusing Robert. Bob Banta his DCFS employer 
got involved and threatened to have him fired if he reported the abuse, which 
would be a conflict of interest with DCFS's objective to discriminate against 
Plaintiff. Again Stewart and others involved with this case may be enjoined 
by Motion as a Doe, when all information becomes available. 
DCSF worker was sent out to testify in a criminal trial against Defendant 
Julie, that she had contacted a DCFS worker and he had given her permission 
to take children away from Plaintiff, without a court order. Records will show 
that Julie left for Heber on Thursday, before she claims to have talked to 
'DCFS on Friday. DCFS record shows that Julie didn't contact DCFS until 
the following Monday. In other words, DCFS was again conspiring to help 
her keep the children by testifying falsely in a criminal trial. Even if actual 
worker that testified is granted immunity, Other DCFS employees knew the 
truth and did nothing to stop this and so will have supervisory liability 
Other Torts Resulting from and in Coniunction with this Civil Conspiracy 
There have been many torts committed in furtherance of this civil conspiracy. 
Those include; Alienation of Affection, Malicious Prosecution, Abuse of 
process, Deceit, Fraud, Libel, Slander, Neglance, Withholding and or 
manufacturing Evidence, Interference with a Business Relationship, Failure to 
train employees in Civil Rights issues, Failure to Train Employees not to 
commit Perjury, Failure to train Employees not to release confidential 
information, peonage, and attempted extortion. 
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73. Third District Court and several Judges of third district court have been made 
aware of the issues and have failed to afford Plaintiff his equal protection 
under the law. As a result of this conspiracy, plaintiff has had rights to his 
children taken away, virtually every saleable asset taken and given to 
defendant Julie Camp, He is now has thousands of dollars in debt and virtually 
no way to pay them. Court set Child Support without using state approved 
chart. When Plaintiff went back to have Child Support adjusted after 
additional children came to live with him, court stated that they now didn't 
have enough income information to adjust Child Support. If they didn't have 
enough information to adjust it downward, then they didn't have enough to set 
it in the first place. He has been sentenced to thirty days in jail and served 
most of them. Court is threatening to do it again. His credit is destroyed 
mostly because of issues surrounding this illegal conspiracy. He will most 
assuredly be forced to take out bankruptcy, neighbors friends and other people 
including children school officials now treat Plaintiff differently because of 
the extensive allegations that were spread around representing that plaintiff 
was a child abuser. After the conspirators have destroyed plaintiffs business, 
and he ends up living in his parents basement with two of his minor sons, 
court is now stating if he doesn't get all his court ordered bills caught up, as 
well as get himself his own place by August, that court will take Christopher 
away from him also. This would be an incredible injustice not only to 
Plaintiff, but also to Christopher and Robert as well. 
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Defendant Judge Robert K. Hilder appointed Guardian ad Litem and Custody 
Evaluator. Rules of Judicial conduct state that judge has obligation to ensure 
that those with whom he appoints are held to same high standards as a Judge. 
After it was made known to Judge Hilder, that Guardian ad Litem and 
Custody Evaluator had both participated in conspiracy to defraud Plaintiff, 
Judge refused to do anything to either of them. These are alleged to be 
administrative functions and not judicial functions. 
Specific Allegations of Fraud, Deceit and Abuse of Process 
Fraudulent allegations of abuse in March 1, 2002 protective order. Fraudulent 
allegations of loans made by Julie's parents. Fraudulent allegations that 
Petitioner threatened Sharon Packer and Julie Cline at Genesis. Fraudulent 
statements that Juvenal Court did not already have jurisdiction over and 
hadn't awarded custody over Robert. Filing a protective order to get Plaintiff 
out of the home when the night of the alleged incident and one night before 
filing a protective order, Julie came over to Plaintiffs side of bead to say 
prayers. Julie fraudulent stated that she was afraid. Fraudulent allegations 
that Plaintiff had previously stalked and old boyfriend of Julies. Fraudulent 
allegation that Plaintiff had violently shook Julie. Fraudulent statement that 
Julie had not given Mr. Cline permission to bring sleeping children into the 
home at time Plaintiff dropped them off. Julie and Sharon had a perfect 
knowledge that the allegations were false and yet they made them anyway 
with the intent to malign Mr. Clines good name and reputation, Destroy his 
business interests, and to intentionally inflict emotional distress. 
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Mr. and Mrs. Packer told Custody Evaluator that Plaintiff had committed 
embezzlement. They were in court when Plaintiff explained that to Judge and 
they knew the allegation was false. They used it to discredit plaintiff. Filing 
of Stalking injunction by Mrs. Packer was abuse of process, as she knew her 
allegations were false and or distorted. Filing of lawsuit by packers against 
Plaintiff was abuse of process because they knew that Julie and Plaintiff had 
both been told that they would be paid for mural when work was done at 
packer home. Judge Eyer never ruled on the underlying claim of payment for 
work done on the home but only ruled on the validity of the lien its-self. 
Judge Eyer issued an order preserving other claims for plaintiff to be filed 
later against packers. Filing of Contempt charges was deceit and abuse of 
process as an agreement was made that if DCFS worker would help convict 
Plaintiff by testifying fraudulently, that Julie and Steve would drop contempt 
charges if Plaintiff would agree to stop going after DCFS and its workers. 
This is alleged to be a conspiracy to deny first amendment rights of plaintiff to 
right of redress against government. Steve Wall documented a one hour 
conversation with Bob Banta and an attorney with the attorney generals office 
to plan having Chris Forsyth perjure herself in court. At the end of the 
contempt trial, Steve made offer in front of Judge Hilder to drop all contempt 
charges if Plaintiff would drop any future claims against him, the packers, 
Julie, DCFS and its workers. The fact that he negotiated on behalf of DCFS 
and others evidences abuse of process and intent to use contempt to force 
plaintiff to back off his claims for fraudulent child abuse allegations. 
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Affidavit of April 1, 2003 by Julie Packer was fraudulent and many of the 
accusations were totally false. Julie Knew that the allegations were totally 
false and they were made to damage plaintiff in various ways. Statements by 
Mrs. Packer to the effect that Mrs. Packer wasn't abused as a child were false. 
Statements made that she hadn't abused Julie and no such Journal entry 
existed were made knowing that they were false. Mr. Packer's denial of her 
mother's alcoholism was also done with the knowledge that it was false. 
Statements made in court and in letter supporting November 2003 protective 
order that Mr. Cline had made false police reports were false. At December 
12, 2003 Protective order hearing, Mr. Packer is caught on tape laughing 
about the fact that she got her children to lie to police officers. In fact each 
and every affidavit submitted by Julie, and the Packers had some lie and 
fraudulent allegation. 
Rule 60 B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for an independent 
action to be filed for fraud upon the court. Since much of the fraud allegations 
are Fraud Upon the Court, petitioner maintains that the fraud was extrinsic, 
because Court orders were put in place to prevent Plaintiff from talking to the 
children, Guardian ad Litem was supposed to represent the children and yet 
she participated in the fraud. Specific details of what children actually told 
CPS workers could not be discovered because of order not to talk to them. On 
December 12, 2003, Court ordered Plaintiff to not communicate with Dr. 
Malovich regarding details of custody evaluation, but put Michelle 
Bloomquist in charge of doing that. Michelle Bloomquist filed motion to 
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quash subpoenas in regards to children testifying, which was granted. 
Plaintiff requested documents from Packers about their ownership of the 
Laytham way home and Steve Wall refused to turn them over. Finally Mr. 
Cline had prepared numerous pieces of evidence related to credibility of Julie 
and her father, but court refused to hear them because they were related to 
contempt filing and deceit and abuse of process. To date, almost 16 months 
after filing of motion for contempt against Julie, court is still stalling Plaintiff 
from bringing that evidence into court. 
Alienation of Affection 
Finally evidence will be presented to show that her mother Mrs. Packer 
abused Defendant Julie Cline. Because of the abuse, Julie has a psychological 
disorder in which she is unable to make decisions outside of the influence of 
her mother. Mrs. Packer was also severely abused as a child and has an 
incredible need to control everything and everyone around her. Mrs. Packer 
was the mastermind and architect of all these illegal, tort actions. Mrs. Packer 
put others up to doing her bidding for her, but she is ultimately responsible for 
her illegal actions. Her ultimate goal was to alienate Plaintiff from his home, 
associations with his wife and children and to destroy his business. She has 
used her extensive wealth to influence others to join in this illegal civil 
conspiracy, but the ultimate responsibility is hers and hers alone. 
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Additional Claims Since Filing 
Since the original claim was filed on March of 2005 and additional situation 
of discrimination has occurred by Julie Cline, Sharon Packer, Wasatch County 
Sheriffs office, Officer Zeila Thomas, and additional Doe's, DCFS and its 
worker, Dean Evans, and additional Doe's, all designed to deprive Plaintiff of 
additional constitutional rights. Currently Plaintiff is seeking damages based 
upon 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985 and 1986 against the state and 
county workers. Because of the Utah governmental Immunity act which 
requires advance notice against state workers, the notice will be given and 
motion will be made to include the state protected portions of this situation in 
this claim at a later time or claim will be brought in another action. 
The situation began when Julie came to pick up minor child Christopher for 
her weekend visitation with him on or about September 10, 2005. Christopher 
did not want to go because he was mad at his mom because she frequently 
fails to come get him for regular visitation. Mr. Cline informed Christopher 
that Weekend visitation is mandatory by the court order and he was to go with 
his mom. When he started to swear at her he threatened to punish hem if he 
didn't stoop talking to her that way. Julie left with Chris. About 30 minutes 
later she dropped him of in front of Petitioners home without even talking 
with him about it. Julie then went to meet Mrs. Packer at Costco, where she 
and her mother planed to again to make false allegations against Mr. Cline of 
Child Abuse. 
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Plaintiff informed Christopher that he was going to drop him off in Heber 
because he doesn't think Chris Should get what he wanted by throwing a 
temper in front of his mother. Julie found out and called Officer Thomas of 
the Wasatch County Sheriffs office that she didn't want Christopher. Officer 
Thomas got a hold of Plaintiff and informed him that if he brought Chris to 
Heber that she would have plaintiff arrested for violating a protective order 
and have his parental rights to Christopher terminated by DCFS. Plaintiff 
explained to her that Chris was court ordered to be there and she was 
interfering with a court order. He also told her that she was attempting to 
violate plaintiffs liberty interest in the care and management of his children. 
(UCA 62A-4a-201) She stated that she didn't care about either a court order 
or Plaintiffs rights and she continued to threaten DCFS action against 
Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff started to Heber and called a dispatcher for the sheriffs office to tell 
them that he was coming to get a report that Julie didn't want Chris. The 
Dispatch said that she would have it when he got there. Upon arriving at the 
sheriffs office, Mr. Cline was informed that they would give him a copy of 
the report. Officer Thomas and other Sheriffs asked to make sure Christopher 
was all right. Plaintiff took them to the car where they asked Chris to come 
inside for a few minutes. After several discussions about getting the report 
and Officer Reid interfering in Plaintiffs constitutional rights, officer Thomas 
took Chris down the hall to question him. Plaintiff protested stating that he 
had the right to be present during any questioning of his minor son. Plaintiff 
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was then informed that he was a suspect. Upon asking what he was suspected 
of Office Thomas refused to tell Plaintiff. Plaintiff then told everyone that he 
was going to leave and was informed that he would be arrested for interfering 
with an investigation. Again officers refused to inform him of what they were 
investigating. Chris was then asked by on of the officers if he wanted to talk 
to them and he declined. Officers still refused to let Plaintiff go. When they 
finally told Plaintiff that they were investigating child abuse, Plaintiff 
informed them that they lacked Jurisdiction to investigate a situation that 
occurred in Salt Lake County. They still refused to let Plaintiff go. They took 
Christopher in a separate care to the Children's Justice Center to be 
interviewed by DCFS. 
When Dean Evans of DCFS arrived he was also informed that he lacked 
jurisdiction to interview Christopher and any investigation should be done in 
Salt Lake County. He interviewed Chris anyway. After the interview he told 
Plaintiff that Chris was not abused and let Plaintiff take Chris home. 
A couple of days later Plaintiff called DCFS hotline and asked to speak to 
DCFS worker in charge of investigation. Plaintiff also started a new 
investigation against Julie for making multiple false reports to DCFS and for 
emotional abuse for her rejecting Chris. Worker stated that she never would 
have opened an investigation for the situation that had happened at Plaintiffs 
home. She also counted multiple false reports made by Julie. To date DCFS 
has never contacted Chris or Plaintiff to interview him. 
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86. In this situation Plaintiff was again denied constitutional rights to determine 
appropriate situations for his children. Julie, Sharon and Police officers made 
false allegations of abuse against him. In spite of lack of jurisdiction on both 
the part of Sheriffs officers and DCFS they still conducted an illegal 
investigation of Plaintiff. When they prevented Plaintiff from leaving it 
constitute a false arrest without probable cause. There actions smack of 
entrapment where they first take rights away illegally. When Plaintiff protests 
then they that he is fighting them as a justification for there actions. 
87. This again presents evidence that it is a long standing principle that is known 
to and acquiesced to by municipalities ant their employees to deny 
constitutional rights to fathers in domestic situations. 
Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action 
Punitive Damages 
88. Plaintiff reaffirms and realleges paragraphs 1 - 87 as though set forth fully 
herein. 
89. It is clear that the Plaintiff(s) acted with malice and with intent to deceive. 
Their actions are shocking and unconscionable. In an action in which they 
were asked to make judgments on behalf of children, they have let their desire 
to get gain and to protect those with whom much of their income comes from 
interfere in their judgment. They have done things that will have a long 
lasting negative impact upon the very children that defendant(s) have a charge 
to protect. They have used the court system to destroy Plaintiff with 
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malicious falsehoods. These should shock the conscious of the court. 
Everyone in society that hears about these malicious actions should be 
outraged. They have committed fraud upon Plaintiff, the Cline Children, the 
State of Utah, and the very Court that should have stopped this. They 
continue to perpetrate their malicious actions on Plaintiff and continue to 
enjoin other state and municipal workers into there malicious actions. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Therefore Plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1. On the First Cause of Action that a Judgment for the amount of the 
$5,000,000.00 or as value may reasonably be determined by the court be 
entered. This should by paid in an amount to be determined by the court with 
the most to be paid by Mrs. Packer, and the State of Utah, if the state is not 
granted some type of immunity. 
2. On Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action that a judgment be entered for the sum 
of $15,000,000.00 dollars or as may reasonably be proven at the time of trial.. 
3. For Declaratory and Injunctive relief as follows: 
4. That all defendants be declared to have committed fraud upon the court, upon 
Plaintiff and upon the Cline Children. 
5. That judgment in Divorce Case 024902228 DA Presided over by Judge Hilder 
be overturned because of the fraud of several of the defendants in this case. 
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6. That an injunction against the State of Utah be granted ordering them to take 
appropriate action against the various co-conspirators employed by the state 
including suspension of licenses for at least one year for Dr. Malovich, and all 
CPS workers involved in the action. 
7. Consideration should be given to ordering Michelle Bloomquist, Steve Wall 
and Anthony Ferdon disbarred for their participation in an illegal conspiracy. 
8. That any of the co-conspirators that have been granted immunity from their 
actions should be referred to the Federal Attorneys office for prosecution 
under 18 U.S.C. 241 and 18 U.S.C. 242. 
9. Declare that Utah State Third District Court has violated Plaintiffs 
Constitutional Rights to Due Process. 
10. Consideration should be given to ordering Judge Hilder to removing himself 
from the bench and or being sanction by the Utah Bar. 
11. State should be ordered to re-work divorce laws, protective order laws and 
child support laws to prevent them from being used to violate constitutional 
rights of fathers. 
12. For reasonable Legal fees and other costs of bringing this action to court as 
may be determined at a trial. 
13. For various costs of collection and other cost of enforcing the judgment. 
14. For interest on the indebted and Judgment as may be determined by the court 
at the legal rate of interest. 
15. For any other specific relief as may be proven just as the court sees fit to 
award. 
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Dated: March _ th, 2005 
Earl L Cline 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of SALT LAKE ) 
Earl Lavere Cline, (Affiant), being sworn and under oath, depose and says that 
Affiant is the Plaintiff in the above entitled action; that Affiant has read the foregoing 
Claim, and understands the contents thereof and the same is true of Affiants own 
knowledge, information and belief. 
Earl L Cline, Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this day of , 2005 
Notary Public 
37 
